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Abstract. We propose a concept called TORPEDO to improve phish
detection by providing just-in-time and just-in-place trustworthy tooltips
to help people judge links embedded in emails. TORPEDO’s tooltips con-
tain the actual URL with the domain highlighted and delay link activa-
tion for a short period, giving the person time to inspect the URL before
they click. Furthermore, TORPEDO consists of an information diagram
to explain phish detection. We evaluated TORPEDO in particular with
respect to its effectiveness: Compared to the worst case ‘status bar’. as
used in Thunderbird and Web email clients. TORPEDO performed sig-
nificantly better in detecting phishes and identifying legitimate emails
(85.17% versus 43.31% correct answers for phish). A proof of concept
implementation is available as a Thunderbird Add-On.
1 Introduction
Phishing is merely a modern equivalent of a confidence trick that has been
carried out for centuries: to deceive someone to derive some personal benefit.
The first time that the term “phishing” was used to refer to this digital version
of confidence tricking was on January 2, 19964. Phishing messages offer a link
embedded in an email message that entices the recipient to click. Email recipients
are likely to click on links due to their widespread legitimate use. If they do click,
it redirects them to a website masquerading as the real thing or downloads some
malware onto their computer. Twenty years after its emergence, phishing still
succeeds [11, 39].Automated detection is a powerful tool against phishing, but
the fact that it takes, on average, 28.75 hours to detect new phish websites
[2] means that users have to detect phishing messages themselves during the
discovery window. However, many people are unable to distinguish legitimate
from phish messages. Since there is no financial bar on the number of emails
phishers can send, this means a sizeable number of people are snared every day.
The goal of our research was to propose a solution to reduce phishers’ suc-
cess in the email environment significantly (note, we studied the approach in
4 The mention occurred in alt.online-service.america-online.
2the email environment but it could be easily adopted to other message formats
such as Facebook and Twitter messages). To achieve this goal, we needed first to
understand why people fall for phishing. We thus carried out a literature review
and a cognitive walk-through analysis of emails as displayed by commonly-used
desktop and webmail clients. Based on our findings, we proposed a concept
called TORPEDO (TOoltip-poweREd Phish Email DetectiOn) to assist users
by providing a just-in-time, just-in-place, trustworthy tooltips that display the
actual URL with the domain highlighted in bold (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, we
disable the link briefly, introducing a short delay, to increase the likelihood that
people will check the URL before clicking on it. Finally, we provide users with
an extended information diagram to explain the phish detection process. An
evaluation delivered significant improvements (85.17% for phish, 91.57% for le-
gitimate emails compared to 43.31% and from 63.66% when only providing the
URL in the status bar, as Thunderbird does it for instance). We implemented a
corresponding Thunderbird Add-On, as a proof-of-concept.
Fig. 1: Just-in-time, just-in-place, trustworthy tooltips as shown in the upper-left
part. The entire figure is displayed when more information is requested.
2 Identifying ons Why People Fall for Phish
It is important to understand why people fall for phish in order to support them
the better. To identify possible reasons for people falling victim to phish, we
carried out a literature review and conducted a cognitive walk-through analysis.
2.1 Literature Review
A phishing email contains a number of signals that may indicate that the email is
a phish, the most reliable of which is the actual URL as explained in [15] and [26].
3Many people do not realise this but, just in case they do, phishers routinely ob-
fuscate the URL to dampen down this signal (e.g. using amazon.shop-secure.com
to phish amazon accounts). Our literature review revealed a number of papers
in which the authors showed that the reality is different since many people focus
on other signals, applying various flawed heuristics, namely:
– The Sender: People are likely to trust emails from friends [16] or from rep-
utable businesses [41].
– The Look and Feel: People judge emails’ trustworthiness based on their first
impression, informed by a recognisable logo [4, 30], attractive design [30, 35],
the use of their name or the provision of the company’s contact details [17].
– The Email Content: People read the email in order to judge the trustwor-
thiness thereof. Relied-upon indicators are the grammar and spelling quality
[35, 30]. Researchers also showed that people are more likely to fall for a phish
when: emotions such as excitement, fear or anxiety [4, 35] are provoked, a
sense of urgency is invoked [30, 34], existing attitudes and beliefs (wanting
to believe that the scammer is honest) are exploited [32], or persuasive and
influencing techniques are used [35, 38]. Researchers argue that under such
conditions of arousal people’s decision-making abilities are impaired and they
are less likely to pick up danger signals [37].
– Wrong Parts of the URL: Some people do look at the URL [17]. However,
they misinterpret the URL due to a lack of knowledge of the semantics of
URLs [9, 40]. Some people are reassured by the mere presence of HTTPS in the
embedded link and look no further [14]. Others are reassured by the brand
name being embedded ‘somewhere in the URL’ [17].
2.2 Cognitive Walk-through Analysis
For one week, we carefully considered emails that we received, examining the
embedded URLs to identify possible challenges which could impair or encourage
phish detection. We examined Thunderbird and Apple Mail as well as Web inter-
faces from three popular Web email clients. We made the following observations:
– Information not provided where expected/needed: Thunderbird5 as well as
the Web email clients, display the actual URL destination in the status bar
at the bottom of the window. Problem: The status bar is some distance away
from the user’s current attentional focus and might easily be missed. The
text of the email is far more prominent and thus likely to be focused on.
– Tooltip provided by sender: Some email senders provide a tooltip which
appears when the mouse hovers over the link when using Thunderbird or
the Web email clients6 while the actual URL is still displayed in the status
bar. Providing such tooltip is actually a very simple attack since the phisher
only needs to provide a “title=” attribute. Problem: The tooltip encourages
examination of the URL by appearing where the user’s attention is focused.
5 Note, this is different for Apple Mail and also for Outlook.
6 Again, this is different for Apple Mail and for Outlook.
4If the recipient relies only on the tooltip, a phisher would be successful when
providing a reassuring URL.
– Redirection: Some email providers seem to make phish detection difficult, if
not impossible. These clients do not display the actual URL in the status bar,
but rather an (obfuscated) URL, a so-called dereferer (see Fig. 2). Web mail
providers argue that they do this to protect their users (due to some checks
before redirecting users to the actual web page). Problem: This approach
makes it almost impossible for even the most security aware to detect the
perfidy of the link.
Fig. 2: Status bar displays an obfuscated URL for an embedded URL
– Tiny URLs: Some senders of (legitimate) emails use shortened URLs to
redirect the person to a different website.
Problem: From the URL it is impossible to know where a click will send
people to. It is necessary to use external services to get the final destination.
– Habituation: While Apple Mail shows a toolbar next to the link in the email,
it does so (obviously) for both legitimate and phishing emails.
Problem: While knowing that one should check the URL in the tooltip before
clicking, due to habituation people are not very likely to check each URL or
even a high percentage.
– Mouse hover vs. clicking: In order to get the relevant information in both
desktop clients as well as in the Web email clients, one need to touch the
link with the mouse while one must not click.
Problem: It is likely that users are not cautioned enough and instead of only
moving the mouse to the link they already click before having checked.
2.3 Reasons Why People Fall for Phishing
From the above findings, the following reasons can be deduced:
1. Not being aware that the URL is the only reliable signal: making a decision
based on the wrong signal.
2. Not knowing which displayed URL to trust. There are three options: embed-
ded in email text, in the displayed tooltip, or in the status bar.
3. Not having access to the actual URL (destination) due to URLs being ob-
scured – either because of redirection or the use of tiny URLs.
4. Not consulting the URL carefully enough before clicking due to accidental
clicks and/or habituation effects.
5. Not knowing how to distinguish authentic from phish URLs.
53 TORPEDO as possible Solution
We try to address all of these reasons with TORPEDO. TORPEDO proves just-
in-time and just-in-place trustworthy tooltips which contain the actual URL with
the domain highlighted. It delays link activation for a short period. Furthermore,
TORPEDO consists of an information diagram to explain phish detection, to be
used together with the tooltips (when first used and on demand). We explain
in the following paragraphs the different aspects and how they are supposed to
address the identified reasons .
Just-in-time means that the tooltip appears when the person hovers their
mouse over an embedded link. This addresses ’Reason 1’ by making the reliable
signal more prominent (at least compared to the status bar used by Thunderbird
and the Web email clients). Just-in-place means that it appears right next to the
link (i.e. more precisely right below the link) and only there. This addresses ’Rea-
son 1’ and ’Reason 2’ by making the most important signal the most prominent
one and always displaying it at the same position. Highlighting the domain in
bold letters (similar to the highlighting in the addressbar of some Web browser)
focuses attention on the most important part of the URL addressing ’Reason 5’.
Disabling the link for a short period , perhaps three seconds while providing
continuous feedback in terms of a counter showing the time left to click (3, 2, 1s)
increases the likelihood of people examining the link before clicking, addressing
’Reason 4’. Note, the delay is configurable to give users control. Furthermore, a
white list is maintained to remember domains users have already clicked on twice
before (requiring two clicks means that domains will not as easily be accidentally
white listed). Whitelisted links will be activated immediately and not be subject
to any delay to not annoy users.
Trustworthiness, first, requires overwriting tooltips provided by the email
sender. This, together with the tooltip appearing just-in-time and just-in-place,
addresses ’Reason 2’. It also addresses ’Reason 3’ partially by providing the
actual URL, instead of the obfuscated one the phisher wants the user to see.
Fig. 3 (a) shows how we propose to handle the redirections (‘redirectUrl=’)
aspect of ’Reason 3’, i.e. providing the actual URL and informing the user that
this is the second but final destination. There are two possibilities to address the
’tiny URLs’ 7 aspects of ’Reason 3’: (1) automatically replace these URLs by
the actual one using the service from http://longurl.org, or (2) inform users
and let them decide whether to check for the actual URL using this service.
From a usability point of view the first option looks more promising; however,
from a security and privacy perspective the second one is more promising (as
e.g. the tool would send requests although the user does not want to visit the
corresponding page). We decided to go for option (2) by default but allowing to
configure option (1). Thus, users would first see the upper tooltip of Fig. 3 (b)
and the other one once decided to check for the actual URL.
7 According to Wikipedia popular shortening services are: bit.ly, goo.gl, ow.ly, t.co,
TinyURL, and Tr.im. The URL is parsed accordingly. Those services are addressed.
6(a) Redirection case (b) Shortened URL case
Fig. 3: Example tooltips
Information diagram, to support users in phish detection in general but in
particular in checking the URL. This diagram (see Fig. 1) addresses mainly
’Reason 5’. It was iterated several times based on feedback from lay people. The
diagram is shown when users initially start using our tooltips. Since users are
not regularly confronted with phishing emails they may forget the rules after
installation, the diagram is also available on-demand. The information diagram
contains the following content while using a process approach explaining step by
step what to do while considering the URL manipulation tricks introduced in
[7] namely obfuscation, misleading, mangle and camouflage:
– In Step 1, we suggest focusing only on the URL. This addresses the fact that
people do not focus on the URL (’Reason 1’). It is also explained that the
remaining parts of the URL can easily be faked.
– In Step 2 we recommend that people actually only consider the highlighted
part of the URL displayed in the tooltip.
– In Step 3, we explain that they should check whether the brand name is
highlighted (to address misleading URLs such as amazon.shop-secure.com
but also obvious phishes such as IP addresses). More precisely, we explain
that they should ignore the remaining parts of the URL.
– In Step 4, we advise them to check for extensions of the brand name such
as in amzon-shopping-in-America.com. This the most difficult phishing URL
to detect as some companies use such extensions in their authentic domain.
We, thus, recommend that they search at Google if they are not sure.
– In Step 5, we recommend that they check letter by letter to identify small
modifications in the domain name (to pick up mircosoft.com).
4 Evaluation
We wanted to evaluate TORPEDO’s effectiveness, efficiency and user-engendered
confidence in terms of properly judging the authenticity of emails, as compared
to the status quo status bar display in Thunderbird and the considered Web
7email clients. To do so, we conducted a between-subjects online study launched
on SoSciSurveywith participants randomly associated to one of two groups:
– Status bar: The group sees the URLs in the status bar.
– TORPEDO: The group sees the URL in a tooltip with domain highlighted
in bold while having seen the information diagram.
Moreover, we formulated the following hypotheses:
– H1 – Phish detection: The TORPEDO group will detect more phishing
emails, as compared to the status bar group.
– H2 – Authentic eMail identification: The TORPEDO group will iden-
tify more authentic emails, as compared to the status bar group.
– H3 – Efficiency: The TORPEDO group will judge emails more quickly,
as compared to the status bar group8.
– H4 – Confidence: The TORPEDO group will be more certain of their
judgements, as compared to the status bar group.
4.1 Study Procedure
The study comprised the following three phases9:
Phase 1 – Welcome: General information was provided, including the goal of
the study, number of phases, the estimated duration, and data protection. We
explained that it was important not to seek assistance (we did not elaborate by
citing Google, as this could have been counter productive). We introduced the
main tasks: They should imagine that their friend Max Mu¨ller is about to work
through his emails. Since Max has accounts at all the companies in question, it
is important for him to know which emails are authentic and which are phish.
Therefore, they were asked to help him to judge the emails based on screenshots
which Max provides to them on the following pages.
Phase 2 – Judging screenshots: Participants were presented with screenshots of
16 emails (8 authentic / 8 phish) each on a different web service and in random
order. The TORPEDO group got in addition the information diagram, both
before starting to answer questions as well as below each screenshot. Participants
were asked: Is the email authentic? Then participants were then asked: How
certain are you that you properly judged the displayed emails. The TORPEDO
group was also asked to comment on the information diagram.
Phase 3: Demographics: We requested demographic information.
4.2 Creation of Email Screenshots
We selected 16 web service providers based on the degree of popularity based on
Alexa (see Table 1). For all of these, we determined what authentic emails look
8 Note, on the one hand it is important that people take their time to check the URL,
however in addition, if they know what to consider, they can make decisions faster.
9 Questions were translated from German for this paper.
8like (including the ‘from’ address). All emails addressed the ‘Heartbleed-Bug’.
The text recommended that the recipient change their password and provided a
link to facilitate this. The text slightly differed from one email to the next but the
meaning remained the same. All raising some (but not strong) pressure to change
the password. Then, half of the screenshots were ‘turned into’ a screenshot of
a phish email by modifying the URL. For the TORPEDO group a tooltip was
added to display the relevant link. We decided to simulate a worst-case scenario,
i.e. advanced phishing emails which can only reliably be detected by checking the
URL. We wanted to investigate the difference between the status bar and tooltip,
and not the impact of various different signals. All emails were personalised. We
also used HTTPS for both phish and non-phish displays because we did not want
the absence or presence of HTTPS to constitute a cue due to the findings in Section
2.1. Next, we considered which URL manipulation techniques to apply to get
a representative set of manipulated URLs. Researchers have identified different
URL manipulation classifications [7, 15, 25]. We used the categories from [7] with
each type’s anticipated success depending on how well users understand URLs
and the thoroughness of their URL checking:
– Obfuscate: The phish URL is composed of an arbitrary name or IP address.
Note, the brand name of the authentic website does not appear.
– Mislead: The phish URL embeds the authentic name somewhere (e.g. in the
subdomain or the path) in order to allay suspicions.
– Mangle: The phish URL includes letter substitutions, different letter order-
ing, or misspelling e.g. arnazon instead of amazon.
– Camouflage: The domain name of the phish URL contains the brand name
together with an extension or a different top level domain.
4.3 Ethics, Recruitment, and Incentives
Our University’s ethical requirements with respect to respondent consent and
data privacy were met. Participants first read an information page on which they
were assured that their data would not be linked to their identity and that the
responses would only be used for study purposes. Furthermore, using SoSciSur-
vey ensured that data was stored in Germany and thus subject to German data
protection law. No debriefing was necessary. We recruited participants through a
platform called Workhub, which is a German equivalent of Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Every Workhub participant receives e3.
5 Results and Discussion
The demographics are summarized for both groups in Table 2. Participants
in the TORPEDO group, on average, detected phishing emails 85.17% of the
time and they, on average, identified legitimate emails as such 91.57% of the
time. The corresponding percentages for the control group are: 43.31% for phish
9Table 1: Legitimate(L) and Manipulated(M) URLs incl. type of manipulation.
Brand URL (abbreviated with ‘...’)
Postbank L: https://banking.postbank.de/rai/login
Ebay L:https://signin.ebay.de/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&UsingSSL...
Xing L: https://login.xing.com/login?dest_url=https\%3A\%2F\%2Fwww...
Google L: https://accounts.google.com/login?hl=de
Dropbox L: https://www.dropbox.com/s/VPrize8EppElIxxWOwETRB87 Pe733AR...
Telekom L: https://accounts.login.idm.telekom.com/oauth2/auth?response...
Zalando L: https://www.zalando.de/login/
MediaMarkt L: https://www.mediamarkt.de/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Logo...
Facebook L: https://www.facebook.com/login
(Obfuscate) M: https://130.83.167.26/login
Flickr L: https://login.yahoo.com
(Obfuscate) M: https://www.xplan.com/signing/flickr/
Twitter L: https://twitter.com/login
(Mislead) M: https://twitter.webmessenger.com
Amazon L: https://www.amazon.de/ap/signin
(Mislead) M: https://www.amazon.de.buecherkaufen.de/ap/signing?...
DeutscheBank L: https://www.deutsche-bank.de
(Mangle) M: https://meine.cleutsche-bank.de/trxm/db/i nit.do?login...
Maxdome L https://www.maxdome.de/
(Mangle) M: https://www.maxdorne.de/?fwe=true&force-l ogin-layer=true
Paypal L: https://www.paypal.com/signin/?country.x=DE&locale...
(Camouflage) M: https://www.paypalsecure.de/webapps/mpp/ho me
GMX L: https://www.gmx.net
(Camouflage) M: https://meinaccount.gmxfreemail.de/
detection and 63.66% for identifying legitimate emails. Note, participants, on
average, detected Camouflaged URLs 72.09% of the time in the TORPEDO
group and 38.37% in the status bar group, Misleading URLs 87.21% versus
30.23%, Mangled URLs 91.86% versus 37.20%) and Obfuscated URLs 89.53%
versus 67.44%. Furthermore, the corresponding numbers for the answer ‘I do not
know’ are (TORPEDO/status bar): 3.49%/6.98%, 2.91%/7.56%, 2.33%/8.14%,
and 5.81%/5.23%. The descriptive data for H3 and H4 is depicted in Fig. 4.
As to the violation of homogeneity of variances for the compared groups we
started our analyses with Mann–Whitney U tests for every hypothesis supple-
mented with an approximated effect size.
Table 2: Demographics
# Participants Average Age Median Youngest Oldest Male IT Expert
Status bar 43 25.70 23 17 54 25 5
TORPEDO 43 27.86 26 18 60 25 2
H1 – Phish Detection: Our analysis shows a significantly improved detection
rate for phish Emails for participants in the TORPEDO group, as compared to
those in the statusbar group (U = 210, p < .001, η2 = 0.455).
H2 – Authentic Email Identification: Our analysis shows a significantly
improved identification rate of authentic Emails for participants in the TOR-
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Fig. 4: Descriptive data for timing and certainty of correct decision.
PEDO group, as compared to those in the status bar group (U = 304, p < .001,
η2 = 0.374).
H3 – Efficiency: Our analysis shows that participants in the TORPEDO
group were significantly more efficient than participants in the status bar group
(U = 676.5, p = .032, η2 = 0.053).
H4 – Confidence: Our analysis shows that participants in the TORPEDO
group were significantly more certain about their decisions than participants in
the status bar group (U = 536.5, p < .001, η2 = 0.155).
Diagram Feedback. We used open coding to analyse the free text answers. We
came up with the following categories: ‘grateful’, ‘nothing to improve’, ‘confus-
ing’, ‘too much information’, ‘too little information’, and ‘small improvements’.
Most of the participants (29 from 43 in total) were happy with the diagram, not
mentioning anything to improve. Three were grateful. Eight mentioned that the
diagram was confusing and five added that the confusion cleared once they read
it. Two participants considered the diagram to contain too much information
while another two participants complained about it giving too little information
(requesting more examples). Three provided small suggestions for improvement:
provide a title, and reconsider the usage of terms such as phish and URL.
Discussion. The results show that, in the studied scenario, we significantly
improved phish detection as well as the identification of legitimate emails with
TORPEDO. The detection rates for all four phishing types increased, too. The
participants in the TORPEDO group are also more confident that they made
the proper decision in comparison to the status bar group. The decision making
process is also significantly more efficient. Operating more quickly can, in the
long run, lead to more errors being made. It is worth providing people with
information such as that given in the information diagram since it is easy to apply
and requires the email recipient to spend less time checking each individual email.
The feedback to the information diagram showed that there is not much need to
improve the diagram other than making the numbers clearer and adding a title.
We acknowledge that the diagram might not provide sufficient information for
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some people. In these few cases, we recommend extending our defence approach
with existing proven training approaches (see Section 6).
Limitations. We acknowledge that we evaluated the approach in a best-case
scenario as their primary task was security. Phishing effectiveness evaluations in
field studies are not possible due to ethical and legal constraints. Lab studies also
have their limitations because participants would not use a study laptop instead
of their own. We also acknowledge that the URLs were displayed the entire time
and not only when hovering the mouse over the link. This only partially simulates
the proposed delay. Note, we only used HTTPS since we wanted to assess their
ability to check the actual URL, not the presence or absence of HTTPS. Finally,
we acknowledge that the sample was not representative.
6 Related Work
Researchers have proposed different ways of addressing phishing:
Automated Detection. Phishing emails can be detected either pre- or
post-click. Emails can be analysed by the email provider before being forwarded
to the user. This analysis includes checking the integrated URLs against sev-
eral blacklists provided by companies such as Microsoft, Google and phishTank.
Other checks can also be carried out. For example, to look at differences between
displayed and actual domain names [12] or carry out an NLP analysis of the ac-
tual email text [36]. If the email is delivered and the person clicks, post-click
detection can also occur. Web browsers or Add-ons can check the URL against
various blacklists or check the web site content in combination with the actual
URL. A number of different approaches for these checks have been proposed [27,
3, 28, 31]. In both pre- and post-click checks a risky situation can either lead to
blocking or a warning e.g. [24, 29, 42, 40]. As a final comment, there is an inher-
ent flaw to post-click warnings. The human tendency to consistency makes it
less likely for people to even want to detect the deceptive nature of any site if
they have already committed to the process [8]. They have judged the email to
be legitimate. Withdrawing at this stage is unlikely. TORPEDO does not aim
to replace detection approaches but to complement them in order to help people
to protect themselves in case none of the checks detects the phish or it is simply
during the pre-detection window [2].
Training. A number of researchers have focused on training users to spot
phish [1, 5, 6, 18, 20–22, 33] but most of them address phish detection in a web
browser context. Researchers have shown that training improves phish detection
rates. Training has two drawbacks as compared to TORPEDO. First, people
need to be aware that there is a problem and that they need to be active in
dealing with it. Otherwise they will not undergo training. This problem was
addressed by Kumaraguru [23] by employing the concept of teachable moments,
where people are given instructions or training when they almost fall for a phish.
In their scheme, instead of blocking a link they allow it, and then show them
that they almost fell for a phish. Second, people may forget the information the
training imparted as they are not confronted with phishing emails every day.
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Again the teachable moment approach can help. However, we think providing
the information graphic on demand, as and when required, is the safer approach
as it might be that the next time they forget how to check the teachable moment
mechanism may not be installed and they would be unprotected. Dodge et al.
[10] report a different approach, post-click training. They send out fake phish
messages and then train people who click on the links. They report a positive
effect. However, this approach can only be taken within an organisation.A few
participants in our evaluation had trouble understanding our diagram. For those,
more exhaustive training may help them. Note, the training, as such, would be
shorter than what would be required without TORPEDO.
Combining Approaches. We propose TORPEDO to complement existing
approaches to address the email phishing problem. Other researchers have also
proposed combining approaches to maximise phish protection. Khonji et al. [19]
suggest a two-pronged approach, the first prong being user training, and the sec-
ond being automated detection. The latter includes blacklists, machine learning
and visual similarity detection. Frauenstein and Von Solms [13] propose combin-
ing human, organisational and technical measures. The first includes awareness
and training, the second policies and procedures and the last one includes auto-
mated measures to detect phish.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Phishing is a thorny issue. Trying to filter out phishing emails before they reached
the end users reduces the problem. Great strides have been made in this direction
but no one will claim that any automated system will catch 100% of phishing
emails. So, it is up to the end users to protect themselves. The research we
have presented here offers a way to support end users by deploying TORPEDO
providing just-in-time, just-in-place, trustworthy tooltips; disabling links for a
short period of time; detection of re-directions and tiny URLs, and providing a
diagram at installation, or on demand, that encapsulates phish detection advice
in a step by step fashion. This approach was evaluated and improved. We found
that it highly significantly improved phish and legitimate email detection, made
such detection significantly faster and led to people feeling more confident about
their judgements compared to the status bar approach as used in Thunderbird
and Web email clients. With 85.17% phish detection compared to 43.31% with
the status bar URL display, it can only be hoped that the different email clients
and email providers deploy this approach as soon as possible. Until then, peo-
ple can use the TORPEDO Add-on we developed. As future work, we plan to
conduct acceptance tests to determine whether TORPEDO will indeed be used.
We also plan to extend this approach to mobile email clients.
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